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ABSTRACT
This paper studies competition among alternative regulatory bodies for
authority over innovative financial contracts. In the United States, this rivalry
embraces not only the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities
and Exchange Commission, but state and federal deposit—institution regulators and
various private regulatory cooperatives. From a political perspective, multiple
regulators develop as a way of formally providing ongoing protection for the
interests of diverse political constituencies. But from an economic perspective,
competition resulting from overlaps in regulatory responsibility establishes an
evolutionary mechanism for adapting regulatory structures to technological and
regulation-induced innovation. Using both perspectives, this paper explains how
interaction between governmental regulatory agencies and self—regulatory coopera-
tives produces more-efficient regulatory structures over time.
The study also seeks to catalog the particular costs and benefits that may be
associated with the regulatory tools used to control futures and securities markets
(e.g., broker and trader registration, disclosure requirements, margin requirements,
and contract-approval processes) and with changes in the distribution of jurisdic-
tion over these tools. The analysis seeks to clarify the tradeoff between the
perceived probability of various problems of market performance (e.g., contract
nonperformance, widespread financial instability, and activities such as price
manipulation by which corrupt or sophisticated operators separate naive investors
from their wealth) and the implicit and explicit cost of reducing this probability.
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Edward 3.Kane*
Inits questforinvestor dollars, the financial-services industry encompasses
fourdistinct layers of competition. Some of these layers are more visible than
others. The two most-obvious layers occur in output and input markets, as private
firms compete against each other for retail and wholesale customers and for
factors of production. Two more-subtle layers comprise competition for jurisdic-
tion among and between private and governmental suppliers of regulatory services.
In the retail sector of finance, firms compete with each other to perform
transactional, safekeeping, insurance, and advisory services for investors. This
competition focuses on both the quality and the cost of service. On the quality
side, a firm tries to build volume by establishing a reputation for honest and
reliable service and by maintaining a product line regularly readapted to the
evolving needs of its targeted base of customers. On the cost side, a firm seeks to
build profits by installing production processes and organizational structures
capable of producing and delivering front-office and back-office services at high
efficiency.
Few retail firms find it efficient to produce all of their back-office services
in-house. Most of them establish links with firms that wholesale back-office
services of various kinds.For brokerage activities, back-office services are
provided by clearing firms (many of which also have extensive front-office
departments) that are members of one or more of the nation's various securities,
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options, and futures exchanges. At the same time that back-office firms compete
with each other for institutional and retail business, exchanges compete for the
chance to execute and settle associated trades for back-office firms. Because
transactions on different exchanges may be structured to have similar effects on
portfolio risks and returns, securities, options, and futures exchanges may be
regarded as generalized substitutes for one another.Like firms, exchanges
compete on the basis of quality and cost, too. Exchanges regularly adjust the line
of contracts they trade to accommodate shifts in investment tastes and technol-
ogy. As cooperatives of clearing firms, they have a clear interest in enhancing the
exchange's reputation for honest and reliable service. This leads them to impose
and to enforce rules designed to protect investors against unscrupulous traders,
issuers, brokers, and clearing firms and to undertake programs to educate investors
about the advantages of trading the contracts they list. The process of setting and
enforcing exchange rules exemplifies the concept of industry self-regulation.
Incumbent politicians cannot afford to be indifferent to the quality and
quantity of financial-services regulation. In exchange for past and future constitu-
ent services, their election confers on them a series of duties and collective
monopoly rights in the regulation market. For at least two reasons,. politicians
face incentives to assign an additional layer of regulation to governmental bodies.
One reason is the public's lack of confidence in the process of self-regulation, a
lack of confidence that gains special urgency when it is renewed and reinforced by
an unfolding scandal or crisis. Precisely because an exchange is a cooperative,
individual members may disagree as to how perfect a set of safeguards the
exchange should erect against abuses of different kinds. As a device for resolving
such disagreements, industry self-regulation is suspect politically because investor
interests are represented only indirectly.Investors fear that industry self-3
regulatoryentities routinely permit regulatees to levy excessive transactions
charges and that they may otherwise underweight investor interests at critical
junctures. In addition, recognized and unrecognized gaps in coverage inevitably
create loopholes that permit some types of financial-services firms to operate
outside the framework of industry self-regulation.
The second reason is the opportunity that government regulation affords
incumbent politicians and their parties for collecting implicit tax revenue and
extracting campaign contributions from regulatees. Whether or not the govern-
ment has a comparative advantage in the production' of at least a few regulatory
services, nationalizing regulatory activities fosters the impression that politicians
have financial markets under control and improves their ability to shake down
industry participants for campaign funds and to reward supporters with jobs or
specially tailored amendments to pending legislation.
Recognized boundaries between the jurisdictions of alternative regulators
overlap in important ways. This overlap makes it hard for individual regulators to
regard the joint task of investor protection as a strictly cooperative game.
Instead, although different regulatory bodies cooperate with each other on some
dimensions, they compete for dients and budget resources on others. This paper
contends that both the cooperative and the competitive behaviors of overlapping
regulatory entities conform to standard economic principles. Managers of these
enterprises seek to maximize some index of their and their institution's welfare,
subject to constraints imposed on their behavior by technological, market, and
political forces.
In choosing their internally optimal pattern of regulation, governmental and
industry regulators have different goals and face different constraints. Especially
in the short run, industry regulators tend to be guided by industry opinions as to
what problems need to be addressed and as to which of several proposed solutions4
couldprove viable.The set of problems and solutions on which the industry is
prepared to act tend to be a sm.all subset of those about which public agitation
exists. Of course, over longer periods, industry attitudes must respond to public
opinion, especially when a developing consensus begins to press politicians and
government regulators to push the frontiers of governmental regulation into new
territory. Typically, heads of governmental agencies are concerned with promoting
their agency's and their own political standing. This standing is served by trying to
increase their agency's fiscal resources, while producing constituent services,
avoiding actions that displease elected politicians, and shielding these higher
authorities from public criticism concerning whatever problems emerge. This
translates into trying to increase an agency's regulatory dominion and to decrease
the chances that a crisis or scandal occurs in any manager's bailiwick during his
own particular term in office. Given that agency heads seldom hold office very
long, the desire to conduct a trouble-free watch imparts a myopically over-
regulatory bias to agency decision making.
I. Costs and Benefits of Regulatory Competition
This paper's particular focus is competition (carried on primarily through
regulatory adjustments and processes of entry and exit), not among autonomous
private entities, but among self-interested federal and state governmental regula-
tory agencies and private regulatory cooperatives. In studying the multilayered
pattern of competition for investor trading dollars, it is convenient to treat
regulation as an excise tax on trading activity. Like any other excise tax, the
regulatory tax tends to reduce the equilibrium output of the taxed commodity. The
higher the level of the tax, the larger is the output reduction. Investors, financial
firms, and regulators all fight over the level and structure of the regulatory tax,
while governmental and industry regulators fight also about the distribution of the5
proceeds. To simplify the pattern of regulatory competition, the roles played by
trade associations and state regulators are deliberately left out of the analysis.
The argument develops' the hypothesis that, in the long run, competition
among financial regulators lowers the level of the regulatory tax by fostering
efficiency in the production of regulatory services. Much as in other kinds of
competition, regulatory competition is guided by an invisible hand to produce
subtle and long-run benefits that are imperceptible to uncritical observers. Even
though regulatory overlaps impose avoidable short-run costs, they facilitate a
generalized form of market entry and exit that promotes dynamic or evolutionary
optimality. Duplicate regulatory functions and overlapping administrative bound-
aries provide opportunities for the entry and exit of regulatees. Regulated firms
(especially new entrants into regulated and substitute markets) shrink the domains
(and therefore the budget resources) of regulators whose response to the evolving
needs of the marketplace proves short-sighted or inflexible.
Opportunities for regulatees to switch regulators and for regulators to enroll
additional classes of regulatees protect investors from experiencing the over-
regulation to which a monopoly supplier would tend. Especially when ongoing
technological and regulation-induced change impel regulators and market partici-
pants endlessly to learn new behaviors, regulatory competition induces more timely
and economically better-adapted adjustments in regulatory structures than mon-
opoly regulators would choose to make.It encourages regulators to adopt
regulatory strategies that are attractive to new forms of business organization and
to producers of innovative products. In addition, interregulator rivalry tends to
smooth out "over-regulation bubbles" that might occur in response to financial-
market crises (such as the speculative boom and bust in silver prices in 1979-80)
and scandals (such as the 1976 manipulation of potato futures) if financial-
regulation "barriers to entry" were more significant.
Iurcaucratic competition for regulatory jurisdiction is imbedded in the
federal system of goverriiiiciit. it is Part of the Artierican way. Although it liLikes6
in the short run for messy organization charts and an o'erabundance of government
agencies, this competition improves the long-run adaptive efficiency of govern-
ment regulation. It is part of the constitutional system of checks and balances that
restrains the arbitrary exercise of political power in the United States. Although
regulated entities' ability to switch regulatory affiliations is constrained by various
legal obstacles, opportunities for regulators to extend their dominion to new types
of institution and the existence of even greatly constrained options for regulatees
to switch regulators create incentives for efficient regulator adaptation. Potential
loss of domain undermines agency goals and brings economic pressure on bureau-
crats to alleviate many of the burdens that in a changing marketplace an inherited
system of regulation would otherwise impose on regulated firms and their custom-
ers.
To focus the argument, it is helpful to define an investor's anticipated true
return from entering a representative financial contract. For a given horizon of
investment, this opportunity return may be decomposed into the following compo-






Rnisthe net return per dollar of a financial contract,
Risthe percentage return on a contract whose performance is costlessly
guaranteed and for which all intermediary parties (i.e., brokers and guarantors) are
costlessly known to be perfectly honest,
Ce is the average per-dollar cost of executing a roundtrip futures transac-
tion,
Ug is the average per-dollar cost of effecting performance guarantees,
including the opportunity cost of accepting residual imperfections in the quality of
the guarantee,7
C1is theaverage per-dollarcost of investigating the integrity and compe-
tence of counterparties,brokers, andguarantors,includingtheopportunitycostof
accepting residual exposure to fraud and manipulation,
m is the average per-dollar monopoly profit earned by guarantors and
brokers.
In principle, the ideal regulatory system is the one that, without adversely
affecting the stability of the financial system (i.e., raising the risk of scandal or.
crisis), minimizes the value of the sum, Ce+Cg+Cj+m. Regulation seeks to
minimize the average costs of\ trading, of guaranteeing contract performance, and
of certifying broker and guarantor integrity and competence, while inhibiting the
development of either monopoly profits or financial instability.In practice,
loopholes in the guarantee and certification system exist and regulatory restric-
tions on entry permit profits to exceed competitive levels. Under a system of
industry self-regulation, incentives exist to produce performance guarantees and
centralized certifications of system integrity at minimum cost, but in cartel-like
ways that tend to maximize the industry's aggregate profits. Pressures that may
lead to monopoly-level commission charges are analyzed in detail by Saloner (1984)
and by Anderson (1984). Although pricing decisions made by an exchange may be
reviewed under the antitrust laws, these laws cannot tightly constrain cooperative
behavior that occurs in the context of a coordinating clearing organization such as
an exchange.
When regulatory services are supplied by governmental bodies, the incentive
to minimize execution costs remains, but the incentive to minimize guarantee and
investigation costs is lessened and political incentives develop to hold profit
margins below the cartel level. We may call the increase in contracting costs that






Whethergovernmental regulation or industry self-regulationis better for investors
dependson whether or not this tax rateexceeds m(I)-m(G), the reduction in
monopolyprofitsclose governmentalsupervisionmightoccasion.
Of course, as emphasized byBaumol, Panzar, and Willig (1983), excess profits
act as a magnet for entry. Hence, the evils of cartel-like self-regulation tend to
prove self-correcting over time. Monopoly profitsin any product line encourage
unregulated firms to develop and to broker substitute contracts. Inefficienciesin
governmental regulation of any product line tend to draw entry, too. The cost
disadvantage that inefficient regulation imposes on traditional competitors creates
profit opportunities for differentially regulated firms to conceive and to market
less-regulated substitute products. Whether attracted by excessive industry profits
or excessive governmental regulation, entry by nontraditional competitorsdisturbs
the preexisting equilibrium distribution of regulatory authority.Regulators'
economic interest in maximizing their client base leads them to fight to win
jurisdiction over substitute activities.
During the correction process, other largely temporary costs are incurred.
The integrity of less-regulated brokers and the performance of less-regulated
contracts are typically less credibly guaranteed than the firms and products they
displace. This exposes investors to a greater risk of fraud and manipulation.The
permanent costs consist mainly of redundant facilities and staffand of duplicate
reporting burdens. These permanent costs may be interpreted as insurance
premiums that the polity pays to reduce its exposure to the threatof over-
regulation.
In markets for financial contracts, dynamic efficiency is served by opportuni-
ties for the set of substitute products and regulators to expand at low cost. In the
short run, although perfect self-regulation would minimize the average costs of9
contracting in existing financial instruments, it would push industry profit margins
above the competitive level. These profit margins would tempt less-regulated
operators into substitute businesses and increase the risk of scandal and crisis.
Whether experienced merely as rising threats or as actualities, scandal and crisis
tend to educe governmental intervention in the form of the nationalization ofat
least some regulatory services. But governmental production of such services is
inherently inefficient. It places a tax on trading activity. On the hypothesis that
any agency's regulatory operation tends to grow increasingly inefficient the longer
it is in place, secular increases in this tax tend to produce politicalagitation for
regulatory reform and to foster the development of less-regulated firms and
contracts. On the bureaucratic level, agistation for reform and expansion in less-
regulated entities encourage competition from other regulators for the right to
regulate the innovative as well as the traditional traders and contracts.
The existence of these dialectical forces make it unlikely that anunchanging
pattern of financial contracting and centralized regulation could remain optimal
over time. Rather, tension between alternative regulators and between regulated
and less-regulated purveyors of substitute financial contracts is needed to keep the
costs of regulation and industry profit margins in the vicinity of their long-run
optimal levels. Concern for dynamic efficiency creates a presumption against
imposing substantial barriers to entry into the financial-services game either for
new contracts or for additional regulators.
2. Analogies to Competition for Regulatory Jurisdiction
Argued conversely, unless the invisible hand is at work in regulatory
competition, it is hard to explain the continued survival of bureaucratic overlaps in
function that are in other respects a source of avoidable budgetaryexpense and
administrative embarrassment. It may clarify my perspective to point out that
most of us grew up under a complex and adaptive system of divided regulatory
authority: a mother and a tather. As children, we learned and relearned to exploit
differences in regulatory styles and goals to lighten the burden that parental10
regulation placed upon us.At the same time, our parents discovered the
importance of regularly exchanging information about our avoidance behaviors and
learned to revise their own rules, goals, and enforcement procedures to our
evolving capacity for independent action.
Like parents, financial regulators simultaneously cooperate with each other
on some issues and compete with each other for authority and f or the respect of
those whose activities they oversee. This competition serves a combination of
idealistic and self-serving ends. The palpable objects of regulatory competition are
implicit and explicit tax revenues, agency budgets, and private and public employ-
ment opportunities. In securities, options, and futures markets, we might hypothe-
size (at least as a first approximation) that palpable regulator benefits are all
proportional to the aggregate volume of trading controlled. Less-measurable
objectives include promotion of broad social goals (such as investor protection and
financial stability) and enhancement of the individual careers of regulators and
elected politicians.
In securities and futures markets, regulatory competition is even more
complex than it is in the intact family, both because of the multiplicity of govern-
mental players and because of opportunities for the free entry and exit of industry-
controlled entities for cooperative self-regulation. The hierarchical levels of
regulatory competition look very much like those we observe in the sports industry.
Exchanges behave like sports leagues that work simultaneously to secure the
allegiance of franchise owners and fans. To protect the entertainment value and
integrity of its game, a league sets rules for management and players and assigns
referees and off-the-field investigators to enforce them. At the same time, state
and federal agencies and courts monitor the business practices of both the leagues
and the I ranchises. In addition, in localities such as Nevada where gain bli rig on
tearti performance is legal, government agencies (gaining conirilissioris) regulate the
performance of offices that book the bets of fans who seek to "invest" in the
performance of individual teams.11
3.Differences in the Quality of Regulatory Services Supplied by Industry and
Governmental Bodies
A major difference between industry and governmental regulators is in their
differential capacity for proactive as opposed to reactive decisionmaking. Securi-
ties, options, and commodity exchanges, affiliated clearing associations, and
industry standard-setting associations exist partly to make the day—to-day work of
governmental regulators easier and partly to make it harder for government
regulators to impose forms of tegulation that damage the markets they oversee.
They offer government regulators the chance to control budget funds and jobs
without having to accept day-to-day responsibility for proactively enforcing the
spirit of ethical, solvency, or competency requirements for brokers and floor
traders. Private regulatory cooperatives negotiate with government regulators to
shape rules on which self-regulators, brokers and floor traders have a substantial
community of interest. Self-regulators and the networks of rules and procedures
they enforce also stand ready to serve as political scapegoats for both politicians
and government regulators in the event that a financial-instability crisis or a
investor-exploitation scandal develops.
Crises and scandals occasion discontinuous and reactive interventions into the
structure of regulation by elected politicians and the courts. These interventions
generally extend and reallocate existing regulatory authority.Typically, in
response to crisis or scandal, politicians introduce one or more new agencies rather
than consolidate existing ones. When the need for reregulation is perceived as
urgent, new agencies are attractive because they allow politicians to develop an
administrative remedy without having to confront directly the constituencies that
stand behind the existing regulatory players. At the same time, the unpleasant
budgetary implications of creating new government agencies and the thrust of
political activity (contributions of time, expertise, and funds) undertaken by12
coalitions of regulated firms create a preference for adopting a self-regulatory
solution whenever this is feasible. Feasibility requires that self-regulatory bodies
have sufficient credibility to let elected politicians and the electorate rationally
anticipate a high quality of market performance in the future.
Reactive politics evoke cyclical expansions in the number of regulatory
bodies. In crisis-free and scandal-free times, the expansive effects of past crises
and scandals tend to be brought under control by two countervailing forces: the
interest of private parties in minimizing the net burdens of regulation and the
defensive responses of regulators whose turf has been impaired, curtailed, or
threatened. These forces express themselves as a political constituency for
streamlining the structure of governmental regulation. The latest manifestation of
the continuing pressure for merging governmental regulatory bodies may be seen in
the interagency Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services chaired by Vice
President George Bush. The Bush Task Group was used by federal deposit-
institution regulators as a way to thwart SEC designs on their territory. Its express
mission was to develop a plan for reducing conflict and regulatory overlap in
federal arrangements for regulating and supervising banking and other financial-
services markets and institutions (Breeden, 1983). Before the Task Group issued its
final report, it considered numerous proposals for consolidating federal regulatory
authority over financial-services firms. However, it ended up recommending a
redistribution of authority rather than a consolidation of individual agencies.
Efficiency in regulation is also the goal of governmentally constrained
systems for self-regulation.This hybrid form of regulation develops when a
government agency farms out the production of investor-protection andconfi-
dence-building services to an industry-sponsored self-regulatory organization such
as thc National AssociationofSecurities Dealers (NASD) or the National Futures
Association (NFA). These organizations are governmentally mandated riiemnberslup
associations composed of private firms in the securities and futures industry,13
respectively. Each entity sets and enforces professional standards of ethics aimed
at preventing fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, particularly with
respect to audit, trading, and sales procedures. Each is also responsible for
investigating and settling grievances between member firms and between member
firms and the investing public. Each was designed as a way to bring firms
operating outside the framework of exchange sanctions under explicit regulatory
control.Finally, each is under the close oversight of the federal agency
responsible for regulating the corresponding area of financial activity.
Differences in the regulatory styles of the federal agencies --theSecurities
and Exchange Commission (the SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (The CFTC) --thatrespectively oversee NASD and NFA operations influence
the character of their regulatory behavior. Differences in SEC and CFTC rules and
requirements are analyzed in careful detail by Russo (1983). In general, the SEC
style of regulation takes a more interventionist approach than the CFTC. Whereas
critics Of the SEC accuse it of "regulatory overkill," most critics of the CFTC
claim that it leaves too much to market discipline.
Systems of joint regulation have the potential to be more efficient than
unadulterated forms of government or industry-sponsored regulation. Members of
cooperative self-regulatory organizations may be counted upon to push association
management to minimize certification and guarantee costs. At the same time,
governmental agencies retain ultimate political responsibility for avoiding excess
charges, crisis, and scandal and may even (as in the case of the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation) be financially responsible for guaranteeing integrity and
performance. This responsibility serves to rationalize the limited transfer of
binding legal authority from government to these entities. Without this authority,
theycouldnot require financial-services firms that operate outside of an exchange14
framework to join, or at least to register with, these associations, nor effect the
acceptance of centralized and uniform certification for competency and integrity
that membership and registration carry with them.
As compared to members of a securities, options, or futures exchange, of f-.
exchange and other association members tend to have a wide dispersion of
interests. This dispersion makes it hard for the association to develop and enforce
cartel-like exclusionary rules that could effectively support sizeable monopoly
profits. However, these blanket associations may improve their membership's
ability to express its political interests. They serve simultaneously as forums in
which to hammer out industry-wide lobbying positions and as agents to represent
industry interests to legislators and government regulators.
4. Disintegration of Inherited Patterns of Regulatory Segmentation
Because the institutional structure of United States financial regulation is
shaped by the interplay of conflicting economic and lobbying pressures, different
pieces of it have accommodated themselves sanctimoniously to a series of
contradictory principles of regulation: for self-regulation over government regula-
tion; for state regulation of local activities and federal regulation of national ones;
for parallel regulation of all institutions involved in a given functional activity; and
for parallel regulation of all institutions of a given type. In futures markets,
functional regulation was exercised first by private commodities exchanges. The
Grain Futures Act of 1922 and the Commodity Exchange Act of 1934 subjected
trading on the existing system of futures exchanges for agricultural commodities to
federal oversight by entities affiliated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
In 1974, resisting SEC requests for regulatory dominion over emerging financial-
instrument futures, Congress transferred federal authority over futures transac-
tions exclusively to the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC).
Finally,the NationalFutures Association caine into operation in 1982.15
With the advent of pooled investments in forward and futures contracts, of
futures contracts on financial instruments, and Of options on these and on stock-
index futures, the potential domain of futures regulators spilled over out of the
commodities markets into the bailiwicks of traditional federal and state securities
regulators. Private stock exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC) disputed the claims of commodities exchanges and of the CFTC to
exclusive jurisdiction over options on financial futures instruments. Jurisdiction
over options was to some extent settled by 1982 legislation which ratified a SEC-
CFTC agreement negotiated in 1981. In this accord, the CFTC dropped its claim
to exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-currency and debt-securities options and its
rights to regulate a few specific futures contracts in exchange for SEC recognition
of CFTC authority over derivative contracts not exempted by the accord.
However, ink on the 1982 Act had hardly had time to dry before the two
agencies began to clash again. In June, 1983, the SEC put before the Bush Task
Group a proposal to merge the two agencies. Moreover, the SEC and CFTC
continued to clash about the desirability of authorizing new contracts on stock-
index futures and options on such futures contracts. The SEC-CFTC accord
legislation attempted to settle the jurisdictional battle over stock-index futures by
giving the SEC effective veto power over CFTC approval of stock-index futures
contracts for which application was made after December 9, 1982. For contracts
for which CFTC approval had been sought prior to this date, the SEC's right to
object is more limited. Although the CFTC may approve such a contract over the
objection of the SEC, the SEC may compel a judicial review of the CFTC action.
CFTC approval of contracts for stock-index futures to which the SEC had objected
was repeatedly postponed to avoid litigation.
On January II, 1984, the logjam was broken by CFTC approval over the
formal opposition of the SEC of a Chicago Mercantile Exchange contract on the16
Standard&Poor'sEnergy Index. Ear from provokinga courtbattle,this action was
followed oneweeklaterby the two agenciesjointlypublishing a set of five
"minimumcriteriaforapplicationsby boards oftrade[i.e.,futures exchanges] for
designationas a contract market for futures contracts on a non-diversified stock
index."Becausethese criteria surrender stock-index opportunities for futures
exchanges that had been reserved in the 1982 legislation, the Chicago Board of
Trade is suing both agencies in U.S. District Court over both the substance of the
new agreement and the informal nature of the administrative procedures by which
it was promulgated. In effect,theCFTC'sregulatoryclientele is asking the courts
to force the agency to protect its statutory turf.
In turn, the development and success of the earliest stock-index futures
contracts brought the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System into the
act. The Board's reasons were twofold.First, authority over futures contracts in
stocks,and stockoptions is anatural extension ofthe Board'sstatutory authority
over marginson stocksand stockoptionsthemselves.Second, aslender of last
resort, the Board presumesthatin any financial crisis itwouldbe expectedto"pick
up the pieces." As financialinstruments proliferate, itclaims thatspeculationon
futures markets is becoming inordinately easy and fears that the possibility of
unbridled speculation in these markets increases the probability of financial
instability. Hence, it wants to develop a set of regulatory tools with which it could
attack what it might see as destabilizing speculation in any markets in which it
might develop. In May, 1983, the Board asserted that its existing authority over
stock-market margin requirements allows it to set margins on options on stock-
index futures, foreign currencies, and CDs. Roughly a year earlier, it had asserted
similar authority over stock-index futures contracts. However, on each occasion,
the Board stated that it would accept (at least for the present) the margin
requirements set by the exchanges on which these contracts trade.17
Asthese controversies makeclear, collisionsoccur not only between the
bureaucratic interests of alternative providers of functionalregulation but between
these interests and the interests of specializedregulators of deposit institutions.
As long as the liabilities of deposit institutions are backedup by a combination of
opportunities to borrow in crisis from the Federal Reserve and asystem of federal
deposit insurance that does not explicitly price asset and leveragerisk, institution-
al regulators must concern themselves withlimiting risk-taking by insured firms.
This concern leads federal regulators of deposit institutionsto constrain and to
monitor their clients' positions in futures contracts and theirexposure via lines of
credit to backstop losses futures brokers might suffer in theevent of widespread
nonperformarice in these markets (Kane, 1984). At the same time,cross-industry
merger activity and product-line expansion by brokerage and deposit firms is
sweeping the activities of deposit institutions into the orbits of securities and
futures-market regulators and the activities of securities and futures-marketfirms
into the orbits of deposit-institution regulators.Deposit institutions that add
futures brokerage or advisory services on hedging andtrading strategies to their
product lines must register the corporate unit involved (usually either asubsidiary
or a holding-company affiliate) with CFTC. If they exercisedesignated functions
(including that of futures commission merchant), they must also join the NFA.
While the SEC and NASD currently exempt deposit institutions (and theirsubsid-
iaries and affiliates) that offer discount-brokerage services fromhaving to register
as securities brokers, both bodies have proposed eliminating thisexemption.
A final force undermining the pre-existing segmentation of financialregula-
tion is a sharply competitive effort by individual statelegislatures to rewrite the
rules under which state-chartered banks and holding-company affiliatesplay. At
the state level, banking lobbies are able to promisejobs, tax revenue, and18
opportunities for crisis-free absorption of failing institutions in exchange for
securities, commodities, and insurance powers that Congress has not yet given
them. At this writing, several states have permitted deposit institutions to offer
brokerage services, South Dakota has authorized insurance activities, and legisla-
tures in Delaware and Minnesota are considering bills to allow banks to underwrite
securities, including the power to own and to vote any stock shares underwritten.
5.Differencesin Individual Regulators' Span of Control
To interpret regulator behavior, it is necessary to specify the goals and
constraints that apply to this behavior. In this paper, we assume that, whatever
other goals a government regulatory bureau may worry about, its perceived
capacity to accomplish its primary bureaucratic mission is paramount. This leads
agency heads to maximize what we may term the agency's span of control. An
agency's span of control comprises the set of institutions and markets over which it
has formal regulatory dominion (its "turf") and the framework of policy instruments
the agency has established for use in shepherding these institutions and markets in
directions it deems appropriate.
In maximizing its span of control, an agency faces a threefold set of
constraints. These constraints are imposed by statutory limits on its authority,
opportunities for regulatee avoidance activity, and action undertaken by competing
regulators.
In any skirmish over regulatory turf, the Fed is strategically positioned. As
financial regulator and stabilizer of last resort, the Fed's span of control far
exceeds that of any other financial regulator. The agency's responsibilities for
macroeconomic stability and its willingness to accept the blame for unfavorable
macroeconomic events whenever these occur make the Fed Chairman a political
force to be reckoned with. Incumbent politicians' overriding need to blame Fed19
officials for any problems in the economy confers on these officialsan implicit
right to exact bureaucratic compensation from a grateful President and Congress.
Part of the unspoken mission of every regulatoryagency includes the task of
reducing pressure on elected officials by diverting criticism of public policies
accepted by these officials onto the shoulders of the agency's top management.
The greater an agency's span of control, the better it can fulfill thisshielding
function and the more political clout it accumulates.
Because they have narrower policy missions than the Fed, the SEC and CFTC
have narrower spans of control. In responding to actions taken by the Fed to
defend what it views as its own span of control, these agencies' narrower turfs and
control frameworks put them at a distinct disadvantage. Measured against each
other, however, the CFTC and SEC seem pretty evenly matched. On many issues,
the SEC's greater age and higher standing with the electorate as a whole is more or
less offset by the CFTC's ability to mobilize F-louse and Senate agricultural
committees and the politically powerful farm lobby in support of its interests.
It is important to recognize that the current regulatory confict is a
derivative phenomenon. The impetus for change is economic, not political. It is
driven not by acts of bureaucratic imperialism, but by structural changes under-
taken by regulatees. Political friction experienced along the borders of the various
regulators' traditional turfs results from exogenous changes in the avoidance
opportunities facing differentially regulated institutions. These opport unities were
created less by administrative action than by longstanding upward trends in
interest rates and in statutory rates of tax on inflation-adjusted personal incomes
and a downward trend in financial transactions costs. Rapid overlap in the product
lines and geographic market areas of different classes of financial institutions is
being brought about by efforts to lower the cost of producing and delivering20
financialservices. The dominant forms of cost reduction appear to be scope
economies: opportunities for firms to produce and deliver an array of financial
products at a lower cost than they could produce the same products on a stand—
alone basis. If the scope economies that are driving product-line ad geographic-
market extension did not include unintended subsidies flowing from the improper
pricing of risk by federal deposit-insurance agencies, the new market structures
and accompanying efforts at competitive reregulation would be unambiguously
resource-saving events.
6. Specific Controversies Over Regulatory Turf
Regulatory goals may be partitioned into three broad categories:
1. Protecting investors against monopoly power conferred on brokers and
counterparties by either superior information or financial-market barriers
to entry;
2. Monitoring and certifying the integrity and ability to perform of brokers
and counterparties;
3. Enhancing the stability of individual markets and of the financial system
as a whole.
Although our presentation has so far stressed effects of regulatory action on the
attainment of the first and second goals, the rhetoric of current disputes between
the CFTC and the SEC and Fed each center on stability. While the SEC concerns
itself with disruptions in specific stock-market segments, the Fed is responsible for
preventing system-wide disruptions in financial markets.
The SEC-CFTC Dispute over Stock-Index Futures. SEC objections to CFTC
approval of stock-index futures contracts have prevented futures exchanges from
beginningtradingin several instruments. In filing formal objections, the SEC
claimed specific violations of two of three criteria that the 1982 SEC-CFTC21
accord legislation requires CFTC-approved stock-index contracts to meet. The
relevant criteria are:
1. Antimanipulation Criterion: trading in the futures contract should not be
readily susceptible to manipulation, nor to causing or beiflg used in the
manipulation of the price of any underlying security, an option on such
securities, or an option on a group or index including such securities;
2. Wide-Publication and Substantial-Segment Criterion: the index or group
of securities should be a widely published measure of, and should reflect,
the market for all publicly traded equity or debt securities, or a
substantial segment thereof, or be comparable to such a measure.
Although the SEC interpreted the first criterion straightforwardly, it interpreted
the words "substantial segment" very severely.It maintained that Congress
intended the second criterion to "prevent trading in the futures market from
disrupting the securities markets and undermining the scheme of regulation in
place under federal securities laws" (Fitzsimmons 1983, underscoring added).
Because the SEC had approved trading in sub-index options for stock exchanges, as
long as a sub-index's components show a substantial capitalization, it was awkward
for the SEC to maintain either that the prices of instruments based on the sub-.
index could be manipulated or that such trading would threaten to disrupt
securities markets.
Except for focusing attention on the issue of how much capitalization might
be sufficient to prevent manipulation, this left the SEC's only substantive objection
the assertion that it saw these' instruments as undermining the inherited scheme of
regulation. But if broad-based stock-index futures and sub-index options don't
undermine regulatory effectiveness, it is doubtful that sub-index futures would. In
this connection, the SEC raised two Points:22
1. differences in customer-protection and surveillance systems between
securities and futures markets, and
2. the possibility that trading in sub-index options could be used to circum-
vent prohibitions against trading on inside information contained in
federal securities laws.
Neither objection truly supports withholding approval of sub-index futures
contracts. On the first point, if destabilizing differences exist in customer-
protection and surveillance systems between the two types of markets --as
opposed to mere differences in regulatory style --thesedifferences should be
identified carefully and the potential for destabilization removed. Such adjust-
ments should occur whether or not a particular set of futures contracts is approved
or denied. On the second point, the SEC could not establish that futures trading in
stock-index futures based on inside information would in fact be legal. Because the
courts have already held trading in stock options to be illegal when it is based on
inside information, odds are good that the courts might find stock-index futures
trading based on corporate inside information illegal, too. The possibility of such a
ruling and the fact that inside information on any onefirm would affect only a
fraction of any high-capitalization sub-index make sub-index futures a less-than-
optimal way for a sharp operator to take advantage of whatever inside information
might happen into his possession. A would-be perpetrator's interests would be
better and more reliably served by undertaking transactions in other, more-hidden
ways.
The SEC identified its major concern as the potential use of single-industry
futures contracts as "surrogates" for trading in individual stocks and stock options.
Clearly, positions in sub-index futures and options on such futures can be
constructed to be virtually equivalent to positions in the underlying portfolio of23
sub-index stocks. But in contending that 1982 SEC-CFTC accord legislationwas
intended to minimize surrogate trading, the SEC put forth the view thatCongress
sought tightly to constrain the ability of futures exchanges to produce substitutes
for stock-exchange products. Such an intention would be blatantlyanticompeti-
tive, since it would tend to protect the profit margins and trading volumes of
stock-exchange members from futures-market competition. A declaration to this
effect is not an explicit part of the accord billts legislative history. Given the
procompetitive ideology by which our nation lives, if Congress wanted to enforce
so anticompetitive a segmentation of financial markets, it ought to have said so
explicitly.'
These loose ends in the SEC's argument left the CFTC in astrong pOsition to
def end either in the courts or in Congressional hearingsany stock-index contract
approvals the SEC might choose to contest. However, in 3anuary, 1984, after the
CFTC approved a controversial Chicago Mercantile Exchange sub-indexcontract,
the CFTC and SEC provisionally resolved their dispute over sub-index futuresby
adopting a set of five numerical criteria that stock-index futures must meet before
they can be designated for trading:
1. Minimum number of securities: the index must be composed of
domestic securities of at least 25 issuers.
2. Index Capitalization: the aggregate capitalization of thecomponent
securities must be at least $75 billion.
3. Percentage Weight Afforded the Largest Stock: no single security
may comprise more than 25 percent of the index's aggregate
capitalization.
4. Percentage Weight Afforded the Three Largest Stocks: no three
stocks may account for more than 45 percent of the index.24
5.SpecialRules Linking Weights to Firm Capitalization for
Non-Capitalization Weighted Indexes.
Although these criteria objectify a negotiated settlement of the interagency
dispute, their enforceability remains to be seen. The SEC-CF IC settlement
purchases bureaucratic peace at the expense of sectors that are not parties to the
agreement. In particular, the agreement harms the jurisdictional interests of
House and Senate agricultural committees relative to those of securities
committees, the economic interests of the futures industry relative to securities
and options firms, and, within the futures industry, the interests of the Chicago
Board of Trade (whose longstanding applications for sub-index contracts had been
tailored to the CFTC's previous reading of the 1982 legislation) relative to Chicago
Mercantile Exchange. Parties adversely affected by SEC-CFTC adoption of these
criteria must be expected to challenge the agreement both in the courts and before
Congress.
Both substantively and procedurally, the agreement displays ample ground for
challenge. It fails to develop a theory to link the designated numerical thresholds
explicitly to the "antimanipulation" and "substantial-segment" criteria set forth in
the 1982 accord legislation, nor can we find such a theory in the literature dealing
with futures markets. Moreover, the criteria were adopted without benefit of
public notice or opportunity for prior public comment. On both grounds, the
Chicago Board of Trade filed on February 6, 1984 in U.S. District Court against
the two agencies for injunctive relief.
Conflict Between the Fed and the CFTC Over Margin Requirements on Futures
Contracts. Fed control of margin requirements on securities traces back to
intuitive judgments as to what caused the depression of the 1930s and as to what
policy tools could be used to prevent a recurrence. In the 1930s, the consensus
view identified so-called "excessive speculation" in common stocks as the culprit25
and supporteda legislative search for policy levers by which Fed officials might be
able to control such speculation in the future. The resolution hit upon was to give
the Federal Reserve the right to limit the use of credit in securities transactions.
For this purpose, the Board was given in 1934 the right to set nd administer
margin requirements on securities holdings. The requirements constrain investors'
ability to use securities as collateral for loans as well as brokerage practices of
account administration.
Russo (1983) contrasts margin-setting practices on securities and futures
exchanges as follows:
Securities Exchanges
The Federal Reserve Board and the SEC both have pervasive
authority over the margin requirements applicable to the options traded
on the securities options exchanges, including options on debt securi-
ties, on foreign currencies, on stock indices and on stock groups.
Because such options are defined as "securities" for purposes of the
Federal securities laws, they are subject to the Federal Reserve Board's
plenary margin authority, an authority that the Federal Reserve Board
interprets to encompass not only the specific levels at which margin
requirements are set, but also the manner in which margin obligations
can be deemed satisfied and the manner in which options positions can
be deemed "covered." Moreover, before they can be implemented, the
margin rules applicable to the options products traded on the securities
exchanges must be submitted to the SEC in a formal rule change filing,
must be published in the Federal Register for public comment and must
be approved by the SEC. The SEC also has broad authority to
"abrogate, add to, and delete from" the rules of a securities exchange,
including the margin rules of such an exchange. In the case of options
on debt securities, foreign currencies and stock indices, the Federal
Reserve Board has, as a general matter, agreed to defer to the views of
the SEC.
Futures Exchanges
The CFTC has no authority to review the futures contract margin
rules employed by the commodities exchanges. The CFTC does have
authority, however, to establish "temporary emergency margin levels"
for any futures contracts "whenever it has reason to believe that an
emergency exists." The term "emergency" is defined to mean "in
addition to threatened or actual market manipulations and corners, any
act of the United States or a foreign government affecting a commod-
ity or any other major market disturbance which prevents the market
from accurately reflecting the forces of supply and demand" for a
commodity. The Federal Reserve Board has asserted, but has not
attempted to exercise, authority to prescribe margin requirements for
futureson stock indices.The CFTC is of the view that its broad authority to regulate
commodity options gives it the ability to review and approve exchange
rules pertaining to the establishment of commodity option margin
levels. However, it has, to date, taken the position that exchange rules
relating to the establishment of commodity option margin levels need
not be submitted to it for its approval. Moreover, because commodity
options are not deemed to be "securities," the Federal Reserve Board
has no authority to prescribe margin requirements for such options. As
a result, the margin requirements applicable to short option positions --
like the requirements applicable to futures contract positions -- are
established solely by the commodities exchanges. The CFTC does
review, however, exchange rules relating to the payment or collection
of commodity option premiums.
Citing its mandate to curtail excessive speculation in financial markets, the
Fed claims that its authority over margins extends to all forms of options and
futures contracts and has asked its staff to conduct a formal study of margin
regulation in financial markets. So far, however, it has allowed federal authority
over margin requirements to be exercised by the SEC for stock options and by the
CFTC for futures contracts and options on futures. Reflecting these agencies'
differences in basic regulatory style, while the SEC closely oversees margin
requirements on securities options, the CFTC possesses only emergency authority
over margins for futures trading and has taken a relatively laissez-faire attitude
toward margins on futures options.
The Fed's professed concern that opportunities for "excessive speculation"
may exist in futures and futures-options trading foreshadows a possible move to
extend its operative span of control into margins on transactions in futures and
futures options. To clarify the efficiency costs of setting higher than micro-
economically appropriate margin requirements, economic experts on futures trad-
ing emphasize that important differences exist between the roles that margin
requirements play in futures and securities markets.
In securities markets, margin requirements mandate a minimum ratio of
ownership equity to borrowed funds that an investor may employ in financing a27
securities purchase. From a broker's point of view, a securities margin require-
ment establishes a minimum level of cash downpayment that he must collect in
selling securities on credit.Because these requirements apply only to loans
collateralized by securities holdings, they cannot prevent investors fromborrowing
their apparent equity in other ways. Luckett (1982) shows that, between January
1966 and December 1979, changes in the level of margin requirements set by the
Fed tended to move stockholder equity in margin accounts by only about 15 to 20
percent of the announced change.
In futures markets, margin is posted and adjusted daily nottomaintain an
equity ratio, but to maintain a credible bond against contract nonperformance.
This surety bond is designed to see that it remains in a contractor's self-interest to
perform as promised even when adverse movements in the futures price impose
substantial losses on his position. Rutz (1982) and Edwards (1983) point out that
daily settlement of gains and losses on futures contracts keeps both sides of the
contract even with the market, so that an investor accumulates no ownership
interest in the futures contract itself.
However, the two types of margin accounts are alike in two ways. First, they
limit the position that an investor can take in a specific opportunity by imposing
additional transactions costs on investors who seek to hold larger and larger
positions. Second, if securities or futures prices move precipitously, demands on
the banking system associated with widespread margin calls could face the central
bank with a potential crisis (Edwards, 1983b).
Under current regulatory arrangements, incentives exist for futures
exchanges to minimize the costs of guaranteeing contract performance.If a
governrrient agency were to take over this function, bureaucratic incentives would28
lead agency managers to set a higher level to reduce even further the odds of a
near-term scandal or crisis to minimize potential criticism.
Excess guarantee costs would act as a tax on futures contracts: wasting
investor and industry resources and redistributing some of investors' wealth-
management activity away from futures trading. This would reduce the efficiency
of risk-shifting opportunities and the degree of liquidity in these markets.
It is hard not to be skeptical of the ability of government officials to identify
spates of destabilizing speculation in any market and to act in timely fashion
against them. But given that the CFTC already possesses authority to set margin
requirements for the duration of a financial emergency and that the Fed claims
such authority as well, the desirability of standby position limits is not the issue.
Benefits to offset the costs of excess margin requirements must be sought in
ordinary, not extraordinary circumstances. To show that it is desirable to control
destabilizing speculation on a nonemergency basis, it is necessary to demonstrate
that the positions squeezed out of the market by higher margin requirements would
be based on less-rational expectations than those that remain. This seems a most
unlikely hypothesis, On the contrary, even if it were possible to identify a set of
investors who could be usefully protected in futures transactions from their own
ignorance, incompetence, or irrationality, it is doubtful that margin requirements
would constitute the optimal way to accomplish this task.
Taken on their face, stabilization benefits from excess margin requirements
on futures contracts seem too small and too unreliable to justify the harmful
increase in generalized trading costs they would occasion. But, in the margin-
requirement controversy, the operative issues are not economic, but political: how
hard the Fed wants to campaign to place futures markets within its ordinary span29
ofcontrol and howhardfutures-market professionals are willing to campaign
against them.
7. Summary
This paper treats regulation as an endogenous process. It models competition
among regulators as a variant of competition amng firms, one that is both
constrained and encouraged by the larger goals pursued by members of federal and
state legislatures, who are in turn constrained by their need to serve the
constituencies on which their power is based. The paper identifies political and
economic costs and benefits that accrue to the regulatory players and to society at
large and constructs a framework for choosing among alternative regulatory
patterns.
The study also seeks to catalog the particular costs and benefits thatmay be
associated with the regulatory tools used to control U.S. futures and securities
markets (e.g., broker and trader registration, disclosure requirements, margin
requirements, and contract-approval processes) and in the distribution of jurisdic-
tion over these tools. The analysis seeks to clarify the tradeoff between the
perceived probability of various problems of market performance (e.g., contract
nonperformance, widespread financial instability, and activities such as price
manipulation by which corrupt or sophisticated operators separate naive investors
from their wealth) and the implicit and explicit cost of reducing this probability.
An additional objective is to explain how taken over long periods of time a
system of governmentally constrained self-regulation can prove economically more
efficient than unadulterated forms of either government control or industry self-
regulation.Buffered as they are by both regulated firms and government
regulators, self-regulatory cooperatives have a unique opportunity to contribute to
economic efficiency.30
Governmental production of regulatory services is inherently inefficient.
Moreover, if it were not checked by avoidance activity and competition from
alternative regulators, the activity of a given regulatory bureau would tend to
become increasingly more inefficient over time.Pressure from alternative
regulators and from brokers and dealers in unregulated and differentially regulated
contracts is needed to force the costs of regulation and industry profit margins to
remain close to minimum efficient levels in the long run. Far from being merely
bureaucratic duplication, rivalry between the SEC, the CFTC, and other regulators
serves to promote dynamic efficiency in regulation. By reducing barriers to entry
into the financial-services industry for new firms and new contracts, regulatory
competition helps the American financial industry to adapt itself to the evolving
needs of the real economy.31
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